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MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION
Jeffrey S. Lubbers'
It is well known that during both the regulatory decade of the 1970's and
the deregulatory 1980's, federal agencies generally relied on rulemaking as the procedure of
choice for making policy. By all indications, the growth of agency proposed and final rules was
strong and persistent. A key indication of rulemaking's centrality was the succession of
Presidential Executive Orders issued to bring this type of agency activity under firmer White House
control.! In short, Professor Davis' oft-quoted 1970 proclamation that notice-and-comment
rulemaking is "one of the greatest inventions of modem government,"' seemed to be not only
prescient but quite justifiable.
ittle noticed amidst this illumina of rules was the fact that agency
adjudication-the seemingly forgotten half of the administrative Procedure Act's procedural
framework (and by far the most disputed port in the debate surrounding its passage)4-was still
there for the using. And when a series of developments began "to take the bloom off the
rulemaking rose," agency administrators were able to turn to the shelf and discover that
adjudicating individual cases might be a promising alternative-a way to get things done without
OMB review and with less intrusive judicial review. If rulemaking was the hare, adjudication had
become the tortoise.
Not that agency adjudication hadn't also undergone some changes since
1946. The government's agency caseload had grown in a fashion parallel to its rulemaking load-
it had shot up in the 60's and 70's and had leveled off in the 80's. The number of federal
administrative law judges (AUs) grew rapidly from 196 in 1947 to 278 (1954, 494 (1962), 792
(1974), 1,070 (1979), 1,119 (1981), where it remains today.' More importantly the character
IResearch Director, Administrative Conference of the United States, Washington, D.C.,
B.A., Cornell University, J.D., University of Chicago. Except where indicated, the views
expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Administrative Conference. Draft prepared for presentation at "Managing Regulation,"
a Symposium on the Organization and Administration of Major Regulating Functions in
Government Agencies, sponsored by The American University, School of Public Affairs,
Washington, D.C., May 16, 199 1.
2Exec, Order No. 11,821, amended by Exec. Order No. 1 1,949 (President Ford);
Exec. Order No. 12,044 (President Carter), Exec. Order Nos. 12,291, 12,498 (President
Reagan)
3 Administrative Law Treatise (1970 Supplement) (§ 6.15); reaffirmed in 1 Administrative
Law Treatise (2nd ed. 1978) (§ 6. 1).
4See Musolf, Federal Examiners and the Conflict of Law and Administration 35-46,
Johns Hopkins Press (1953), reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, (1979).
SSee Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, Regulation, July/Aug.
1981 at 25, 26
6See Lubbers, A Unified Corps of AUs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal Level,
65 JUDICATURE 266, 268 (Table 1) November 1981.
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of agency adjudications had changed with more fact-based benefit, labor and enforcement cases
and proportionately fewer policyladen economic regulatory and rate cases. Finally, just as
commentators were decrying the encumbrances on the once simple notice-and-rulemaking process,
critics were pointing out that the agency adjudication process-once thought to be an expeditious
alternative to court litigation-had itself taken on trappings of trial-type, adversarial formality.'
The reaction to this recognition was an increasing reliance on "informal adjudication," "non-APA"
adjudication, and "alternative dispute resolution."
This pattern of federal agency adjudication has become increasingly
variegated. The many available options and strategies obviously pose challenges for legislators,
agency administrators and managers. It is the purpose of this paper to describe existing patterns
of agency adjudication and to focus on management initiatives that have attempted to come to
grips with these options and strategies. Philip Harter's companion paper will focus on the promise
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as it can be applied to the special world of agency
adjudication.
Overview of an Agency Case
We will postpone for the moment a prolonged discussion of the
"continuum" of agency adjudication which ranges from the most informal decision (e.g., a
determination to disclose an agency "record" requested under FOIA) to the most formal trial-type
proceeding held under the Administrative Procedure Act hearing requirements (5 U.S.C. §§ 554,
556-57). At the outset, it is useful to describe in some detail the major stages of a typical case
on the formal end of the spectrum. A familiarity with these stages is necessary for anyone
seeking to practice case management. These stages can be divided into three: prehearing,
hearing and posthearing. A fourth, follow-on stage (judicial review) needs also to be kept in
mind.
The Prehearing Stage
A case may begin in several different ways, depending on the type of
case and the particular agency's case initiation procedures. Some cases are triggered by an
application, a private complaint, a petition or a preliminary determination of violation made at
an inspection. This initial step may lead to a denial of the petition or application, or to a citation
or notice of violtion based upon the private complaint or preliminary investigation. Further
procedural steps may take place prior to referral of the case to an administrative law judge (AU)
for hearing. These steps might include a formal order of investigation, a formal complaint, a staff
'Id. at 269-270.
8See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 258, 3 11-313 (1978) (noting criticism of the APA as overjudicialized).
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recommendation of hearing, completion of an environmental impact statement and issuance of a
formal order or notice of hearing. Of course, not all cases go through the some prehearing
stages. Moreover, as the Administrative Conference learned in its statistical study of agency
adjudication,9 it is often difficult for an agency to pin down the exact date that a case originates,
especially if the first action in the case occurs in a field office. This presented a data-gathering
problem since the pre-hearing stage often appears misleadingly short.
The Hearing Stage
The hearing stage encompasses the period during which the AU has
control of the case. This stage often begins when the case is referred to the Chief ALI's office.
The case is then assigned to the AU who is to preside over it. Other key dates in this stage
include the prehearing conference, the first day of hearing, the last interlocutoy order (if any),
the last day of hearing, the completion of the record/filing of final briefs, and date of the AU's
decision or order. At some agencies, in simpler cases, AUs issue an oral decision from the bench
(read into the transcript).10
Presiding AUs are given broad powers by the Administrative Procedure Act
to control the hearings," although they lack contempt powers. Hearings are "on the record"
and are transcribed verbatim. Under the APA, "A party is entitled to present his case or defense
by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."' However, in
certain types of cases oral hearings may be omitted or truncated: "In ... determining claims
for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses an agency may, when a party will not
be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in
written form."' 3 This flexibility inherent in the APA's provisions concerning cross-examination and
in the special provisions for benefits and initial licensing cases are often forgotten by those who
criticize the APA's "formalism."'1
4
For case tracking purposes, the hearing stage dates (from referral to the
Chief AU to issuance of AUs decision) are relatively certain and reliably retrievable. Thus statistics
9Federal Administrative Low Judge Hearings-Statistical Report for 1976-1978,
Administrative Conference of the U.S. (1980). (Introductory essays in that publication
describe the data gathering methods in detail.)
'0'This has been the practice, for example, at the National Transportation Safety Board.
"5 U.s.C. § 556(c)(5).
125 U.S.C. § 556(d).
13 
ide14 This point is well mode in Verkuil, supra note 7 at 3 13-3 15.
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collected for this stage (for similar case type categories) should prove useful to managers and
analysts alike.
The Posthearing Stage
The posthearing stage begins when the AU's decision or order is released.
The case then may or may not be reviewed by the agency head (i.e., a full board or commission,
a panel thereof, or an individual administrator) or a delegate of the agency head (e.g., a judicial
officer or review board). Review procedures vary almost as widely as prehearing procedures.5
In some agencies, review by the agency head is within the discretion of the agency and is
infrequent. In others, appeal may be had by right and review is frequent. Under some agencies'
statutes, review is mandatory. Thus a series of posthearing events may take place in an agency
adjudication: the filing of an appeal (sometimes called "exceptions"), the filing of briefs by the
petitioners (and, thereafter, the respondents), oral argument to the reviewing body, and final
agency action. Some agencies utilize an intermediate review board for some or all the cases,
before consideration by the agency head.
The APA does allow initial decisions by AUs to "become [] the decision
of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of,
the agency within time provided by rule." 6 Other statutes, however, may require review. The
APA also gives agency heads great leeway in the scope of their review of AU decisions: "On
appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have
in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."" In
practice, however, this free hand has been somewhat circumscribed by reviewing courts.
From the standpoint of case tracking, this stage is relatively coherent in
each agency although cross-agency comparisons are difficult due to the variety of review structures.
Moreover, even within an agency, because the review structure is normally quite separate from
the AU office, the logistics of following cases through both stages are problematic. Different
docket personnel are often involved at each stage and the AU office usually loses track of cases
after initial decisions are issued.
IsSee ACUS Recommendation 83-3 "Agency Structures for Review of Decisions of
Presiding Officers under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 CFR § 305.83-3; Cass,
Allocation of Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis,
66 B.U.- Rev. 1 (1986).
165 U.S.C. § 557(b).
17Id.
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Judicial review
Although the vagaries of judicial review of agency decisions are beyond
the scope of this paper, agency case managers must keep in mind the impact of judicial oversight.
Formal agency adjudications are normally reviewed on the basis of the record assembled by the
agency. Reviewing courts' factual review is based on the substantial evidence test-meaning that
if the court finds substantial evidence to support the agency's decision (even if there may also
be substantial evidence to support another outcome) the decision is to be sustained.' 8 However,
to obtain an affirmance, the basis for the final agency decision must be adequately spelled out.
Sometimes, of course, the agency simply relies on the reasoning of the AU's initial decision or
that of its intermediate decisionmaker, which is then reviewed by the court. But if the agency
head reverses or modifies the underlying decision, the reviewing court will look for adequate
justification for such departure in the agency's final decision.
Court challenges to agency orders can also be based on broader, legal
or constitutional bases, which if sustained by the courts, can lead to major impacts on the
agency's adjudication process. Remands and reopenings not only play havoc with case-tracking
statistics, and disrupt case assignments and scheduling, they also have ripple effects throughout
an agency's adjudicative system.' 9 Some mechanism has to be developed to translate judicial
doctrine into agency policy transmitted down into the adjudicative system. This has been an
especially big problem where agency policymakers have resorted to selective "nonacquiescence"
in judicial review decisions, by refusing to apply the court's holding to any cases but the one
actually reversed. '
The Role of the Administrative Law Judge
As may be inferred from the foregoing description, the administrative law
judge is the key actor in agency adjudication. AUs preside over all agency adjudications (and
those rulemakings) that are required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing.2' In those "APA hearings" (often as interchangeable with "formal
hearings") only an AU or the agency head (single administrators, board or commission or
1'5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). See Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 340 U.S. 474 (explaining the meaning of the substantial evidence test).
19See Schuck and Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984 (study of judicial remands of agency cases).
20See Estreicher and Reveresz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies,
98 Yale L.J. 679 (1989).
215 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a). On-the-record rulemaking (sometimes called formal
rulemaking) is cumbersome and rarely required by statute.
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members thereof) may preside-and it is exceedingly rare for the agency head to do the
presiding.2'
To protect AUs from undue agency pressure, the APA gave them
independence in matters of appointment, pay and tenure. Agencies can appoint them only after
applicants have passed a competitive "merit selection" examination administered by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) which may not delegate this responsibility to the appointing
agency. 2'  AU pay must also be set by OPM independently of agency recommendations or
ratings. The APA provides that AUs are to be assigned to cases "in rotation so far as
practicable, 2s "may not perform duties inconsistent with their [AU] duties and
responsibilities,"'" and may not "be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of"
agency prosecutors or investigators.21 They are exempt from agency performance appraisals28
and are subject to discipline and removed only for "good cause" as determined by the
independent Merit Systems Protection Board (after an APA hearing).'
The Supreme Court has recognized that the AU's role is "functionally
comparable" to thin of a trial judge conducting civil proceedings without a jury.30 A Senate
committee has gone so far as to declare: "In essence individuals appointed as [AUs] hold a
position with tenure very similar to that provided for federal judges under the Constitution." 3t
This is not to say that AUs are completely independent agents. They are
agency employees who are bound to apply the published rules of the agency. And as pointed
out above, the agency head may rather freely reverse the AU's initial decisions. They also
remain subject to the general administrative direction of the employing agency. As the OPM
Bulletin on AUs points out, AUs "are subject to agency administrative directions in such non-
225 U.S.C. § 556(b). The APA does, however, permit other employee boards to preside
over "specified classes of proceedings" when so provided by statute. Id.
235 U.S.C. §§ 1 104(a)(2).
245 U.S.C. § 5372.
255 U.S.C. § 3105.
261d
275 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)-
285 U.S.C. §§ 4301(2)(D), 53 3 5(a)(5).
295 U.S.C. § 7521.
30Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
31Administrative Law Judges-Civil Service, Senate Report 95-697, Legislative History of
P.L. 95-251, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 496, 497.
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adjudicatory matters as hours of duty, travel, parking space, office space, office procedures, staff
assistance and organizational structure. Of course, administrative direction in such matters may
not be used as a means of affecting, controlling, or sanctioning Administrative Low Judges'
decisions in 'formal' proceedings.""
AU Demographics
As of March 25, 1991, there were 1,090 AUs employed by 31 federal
department and agencies. Another 12 agencies borrow AUs under the "loan" program
administered by OPM. Approximately 71% of these AUs are employed by the Social Security
Administration and another 15% are employed by the U.S. Department of Labor and the National
Labor Relations Board. The other 28 agencies employ the remaining 14%. Only about 200 of
the 1,100 AUs are based in the Washington, D.C. area with the others located across the country.
Applicants for AU positions must meet a series of minimum qualifications
requirements.13 They must be attorneys with a minimum of seven years of experience involving
the preparation, presentation, hearing and/or review of formal cases before either an
administrative agency or a court. Minimally qualified applicants are then rated by OPM on a
numerical scale. They are asked to submit a "supplemental qualifications statement" which
describes their experience in (a) rules of evidence and trial procedures, (b) analytical ability,
(c) decision ability, (d) oral communications ability and judicial temperament, and (e) writing
ability. Those scoring high enough on this statement are then given a written demonstration, a
panel interview, and a reference check. The maximum composite score for any applicant based
on this examination is 100, but federal law also requires that "veterans preference points" (5 for
veterans, 10 for disabled veterans) be added to the score.
Applicants who score above 80 points are then placed on a roster of
eligibles (highest scores at the top) and they are referred to employing agencies for filling vacant
positions as they occur in various geographical areas of the applicants' choice. Veterans'
preference also obtains in the agency selection from the register-on agency may not select a non-
veteran over a veteran with an equal or higher score.
OPM's Office of AUs has been very diligent in maintaining and improving
its process for examining and qualifying AU applicants. In most respects it is a true merit
selection system, far more rigorous than the ad hoc selection process for most state and federal
judges. However, recruitment of women and minorities has lagged considerably. Over 90% of
32Administrative Law Judge Program Handbook, U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(Office of Administrative Low Judges at 2 (May 1989)). This is an excellent compendium
of information on the AU program.
33 d at 5-6.
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all AUs are white males. Of the 1,024 AUs in 1989, 38 (3.71%) were women, 26 (2.54%) were
black and 25 (2.44% were Hispanic). 4  Almost as troubling is the fact that many AUs
apparently see the position as one to retire from-the mean age of AUs is approximately 58."
It is a shame that the AU corps is not able to attract a wider pool of younger and more
diverse judges. Congress should seriously consider whether the detriments of applying veterans
preference to this position outweigh the benefits.
The AU's Role Under the APA
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, AlIs are (subject to the agency's
published rules and to the powers granted to the agency by statute) authorized to:
1. administer oaths and affirmations;
2. issue subpoenas authorized by law;
3. rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
4. make depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice
would be served;
5. regulate the course of the hearing;
6. hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the case by the
consent of the parties;
7. inform the parties as to the availability of one or more alternative means
of dispute resolution, and encourage use of such methods;
8. require the attendance at any conference held pursuant to 1 (6) of at
least one representative of each party who can negotiate over the
resolution of the dispute;
9. dispose of procedural requests or similar matters;
34 See Office of Personnel Management, "Announcement of Revisions in Administrative
Law Judge Examination," 55 Fed. Reg. 52340, 52341 (December 21, 1990) (citing those
figures).
3SOPM, Administrative Low Judge-Program Handbook @ p. 4 (May 1989).
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10. make or recommend decisions in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 557; and
11. take other action authorized by agency rule consistent with the procedural
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551-559.36
Several of these powers have led to questions.
36.5 U.S.C. § 556(c). Clauses 7 and 8 were added by the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L 101-552.
120
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Subpoenas
The authority of AUs to issue subpoenas on behalf of the agency seems
relatively clear. However, in practice there remains some reluctance on the part of a few agencies
to allow the AU to issue them without some sort of agency head approval or signature. This
problem led the Administrative Conference in 1974 to urge (so far unsuccessfully) that the APA
be clarified to provide that presiding officers in all APA adjudications be authorized to sign and
issue subpoenas.3" More recently, the Conference focused on the need to encourage in the Social
Security AUs to use the subpoena power they possess. ACUS Recommendation 90-4 urged AUs
to issue subpoenas on their own motion "where necessary to ensure that medical evidence is
complete, and to obtain other evidence not otherwise available."' It further recommended that
subpoenas requested by claimants should be issued except where the AU finds good cause not
to and proposed that SSA develop "form subpoenas" for use by disability claimants along with
instructions.
Rules of Evidence
The authority to "receive relevant evidence," when coupled with the APA
provision in § 556(d), has led to questions about whether more guidance is needed to either
make these evidentiary rulings easier or to give AUs more encouragement to clamp down on
irrelevant and case-lengthening submissions. Section 556(d) states:
"Any oral or documentary evidence may be
received, but the agency as a matter of policy
shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A
sanction may not be imposed or rule or order
issued except on consideration of the whole
record or those parts thereof cited by a party
and supported by and in accordance with the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."
Bearing in mind that administrative adjudication does not involve juries,
and that therefore many of the technical evidentiary rules concerning the admission of prejudicial
evidence need not apply, the drafters of the APA sought to avoid the use of these technical rules
of evidence. However, over the years, concerns grew that AUs were too often lax in excluding
37ACUS Recommendation 74-1, "Subpoena Power in Formal Rulemaking and Formal
Adjudication" I CFR § 305.74-1 (1991).
38ACUS Recommendation 90-4 "Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process:
Supplementary Recommendation" -3, 1 CFR § 305.90-4 (1991).
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the irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence, feeling that the only risk of reversal was
in excluding admissible evidence. Thus the tendency became "letting the evidence in for whatever
its worth. '  The Federal Rules of Evidence IFRE) were enacted in 1975, applicable to federal
court adjudication (jury and non-jury alike). In 1986, the Administrative Conference urged
agencies to give greater authority and encouragement to AU exclusion of unreliable or repetitious
evidence by reference to FRE Rule 403 which allows for exclusion of evidence when its probative
value is substantially outweighed by other factors, including its potential for undue consumption
of time. The Conference, however, did not wish for Congress to simply require agencies to use
the FRE in its totality.4t More recently, however, as the FRE has become increasingly familiar
to the bench and bar, there has been more movement toward adoption of at least a modified
FRE by federal agencies. The Department of Labor has done so4' and the American Bar
Association and Federal Bar Association are considering a study based on the Department's
experience. 3 This may result in wider use of the FRE, and perhaps, better managed
adjudications.
Conftrolling Hearings
The authority to "regulate the course of the hearing" has led to questions
about the AU's authority to take immediate action against disruptive actions by participants in the
hearing.
Because most agencies have or claim statutory authority to regulate the
conduct of attorneys through exclusion from particular proceedings or disbarment from future
proceedings, the AU's power to exclude attorneys is derivative. AU exclusion of disruptive counsel
has been sustained on occasion, but these decisions have treated the exclusions not as disciplinary
measures but as flowing from the common-law right of an adjudicator to protect the integrity of
39See Pierce, Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adiudications, 39
Admin. L. Rev 1 (1987).
40Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1726 (1975).
41tACUS Recommendation 86-2 "Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency
Adjudications,". I CFR 305.86-2 (199 1), relying on Pierce, supra note 3.
47Department of Labor final rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 13218 (April 9, 1990).
43The Federal Bar Association has encouraged agencies to consider use of the Federal
Rules, FBA Resolution 91.5, "Administrative Agency Adoption of Uniform Rules of Evidence
Patterned After Federal Rules of Evidence (April 13, 1991). The ABA is also considering the
matter. Both bar associations based their effort in part on a study by Professor Michael
Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Acgency Formal Adversarial
Adjudications: A New Approach, U. III. L. Rev. - (1991) (forthcoming).
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the adjudicatory process." AU actions in this regard must be grounded in agency statutory
authority and in regulations implementing that authority. Moreover, such action would normally
be reviewable by the agency head and subject to judicial review. Future debarment actions
normally require separate formal hearings.4"
AU's Insulation
Some of the APA provisions designed to protect the AU's independence
from agency coercion also have the effect of insulating the presiding AU from the agency
policymakers. Some critics have asserted that, at least in nonaccusatary proceedings, this wall of
separation has become too restrictive.46
In addition to the prohibition (discussed earlier) against having AUs be
responsible to or supervised by agency investigators or prosecutors, two other "separation of
functions" provisions in the APA serve to insulate them. Section 554(d)(1) provides that an AU
may not "consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all
parties to participate." As Professor Asimow has stated, this 'hearing officer nonconsultation rule'
has always been shrouded in mystery."' If read literally, it would bar conversations between
judge and law derk on disputed facts. And although many have argued that it should only be
applied to consultations with outsiders, the Supreme Court has not followed that view."
This provision must be read with the even broader separation of functions
provision in § 554(d):
"An employee or agent engaged in the
performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency in a case may not, in
that or a factually related case, participate or
advise in the decision, recommended decision, or
agency review pursuant to § 557 of this title,
except as witness or counsel in public
proceedings."
44See Levinson, Professional Responsibility Issues in Administrative Adiudication, 2 BYU
J. of Pub. L. 219, 242-251 (1988).
45See the SEC's debarment regulation, 17 CFR § 20 1 .2(e) (1990).
46See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 759 (1981).
47Id. at 763.
48Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978) (dictum).
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This means that a certain class of employees, investigators or prosecutors
in the particular case being adjudicated or one that is factually related may not furnish off-the-
record advice to any decisionmaker. Thus, AUs are clearly barred from being advised by internal
staff investigators or prosecutors, even if the "non-consultation" rule were to be applied only to
outsiders.
From a management point of view, what issues are raised by these
provisions? It is easy to see that AUs should be insulated from adversary staff in accusatory
proceedings like civil penalty proceedings or license revocation cases. But what about non-
accusatory adjudication such as ratemaking, initial licensing, merger approvals and similar economic
regulatory cases? The APA specifically exempts these types of cases from the separation of
functions requirements, yet according to Asimow, most agencies adhere to them anyway-thus
preventing AUs from seeking the assistance of uninvolved staff experts, supervisors or colleagues
of involved staff adversaries, and other staff members who might help the judge come to a faster,
beter-informed decision.49
As Asimow has commented,
While these costs [of strict separation
of the adjudicator from uninvolved experts] may
be acceptable in accusatory adjudications, they
must be minimized in economically significant,
nonaccusatory disputes that by law or custom are
settled by formal adversarial adjudications. In
such disputes, the economic and environmental
impact of the decision is frequently far-reaching
and often unpredictable, and the costs of error
are very high. Moreover, such matters are
procedurally cumbersome and already take an
unbearably long time to conclude. Agencies
must engage in prophecy and resolve abstruse
economic, technological, or scientific questions
that are seldom quantifiable and that trigger
intense professional controversy. The claims of
diverse economic, social, and political interests
conflict irreconcilably, and the agency must select
from an almost limitless number of policy
options a d solutions. Consequently, the
49Id. at 797-799.
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decisionmakers urgently need as much technical,
legal and political advice as can be provided."0
A final separation of functions issue also has management implications.
Once the AU has issued his or her initial or recommended decision and it is before the agency
head for review, there is nothing in the APA that would prevent the agency head from asking
the AU for advice or clarification about the decision. Yet this is apparently rarely if ever done
and an Administrative Conference recommendation proposing this practice in appropriate
circumstances was tabled after AU opposition.5'
Can AUs Be Managed?
The short answer to this question is yes and no. While it is true that AUs
are statutorily exempt from employee performance appraisals, they are not necessarily immune
from performance evaluations. Courts have reasoned that because an AU may be removed for
poor performance, it follows that an agency may gather data and form an opinion of an ALI's
performance. 930.211 Prohibits agency rating, ranking, or evaluating.
Much of the law concerning the limits of AU independence derives from
MSPB and court decisions construing the "for good cause" standard for AU discipline and removal
actions found in 5 U.S.C. § 7521. In his exhaustive study of the "good cause" provision for the
Administrative Conference, Professor Victor Rosenblum examined the history and application of the
provision.52 He wrote in 1984 in the context of a surge of disciplinary actions against AUs,
including, for the first time, removal actions based on allegations of low productivity rather than
acts of misconduct s. 3 Most of these proceedings resulted from a long-lasting dispute between the
Social Security Administration and its AUs over elements of the agency's case management
program. 4
Aid. at 800.
51,See Transcript of Twenty-third Plenary Session of Administrative Conference of the U.S.
29-117 (December 1 1, 1981)_
S2Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "Good Cause" as Criterion for Removal of
Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 593 (1984).
S3,See Timothy, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6
W. New Eng. L. Rev. 807 (1984).
5
4See, e.g., Social Security Administrative Law Judges: Survey and Issue Paper,
Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. I st
Sess. (Comm. print 1979); The Role of the Administrative Law Judge in the Title II Social
Security Disability Program, Report by the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Committee Print 1983).
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Taking its cue from a Congressional directive expressing concern about the
high rate at which AUs were reversing initial disability claim determinations made at the state
level and the variance in these rates among AUs, SSA embarked on a series of measures to
scrutinize individual AU decisional activity. Based on a review of AU allowance rates, individual
AUs with the highest allowance rates were targeted for full review of all their decisions by the
SSA Appeals Council. Individual "counseling" sessions for AUs were also proposed by SSA, though
never implemented. Furthermore SSA, in memoranda to its AUs, focused heavily on allowance
rate "goals." ' The SSA U Association sought injunctive relief against these practices in 1984,
and although the court denied injunctive relief because the practices complained about had been
changed, it severely criticized the agency's "unremitting focus on allowance rates in the individual
AU portion of the [review program] [which] created an untenable atmosphere of tension and
unfairness which violated the spirit of the APA, if no specific provision thereof."'"
In another challenge to SSA procedures brought by an individual AU, the
agency fared somewhat better. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
AU's claim that his decisional independence had been infringed by the SSA's "peer review
program," even though the court had found that some of the components of the program may
have been "questionable.""' The Second Circuit was equally supportive:st
"Regarding the Secretary's policy of
settling a minimum number of dispositions an
AU must decide in a month, we agree with the
district court that reasonable efforts to increase
the production levels of AUs are not an
infringement of decisional independence."
"The settling of reasonable production
goals as opposed to fixed quotas is not in itself
a violation of the APA."
SSThe agency's measures are described in the district court's opinion in Association of
Administrative Low Judges, Inc., v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984).
S61d. at 1143.
SI Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2nd Cir. 1989).
sold. at 686.
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The court went on to uphold the Secretary's setting of "monthly production
goals."
In the administrative arena, SSA also sought to remove several AUs on
grounds of low productivity. Again, the results were mixed. In the lead case, SSA v.
Goodman,"' the agency charged that the judge's productivity was "unacceptably low" because
his average monthly disposition rate was only half the agency-wide average of about 31 cases
per month. It was also shown that the judge's annual average "pending" caseload was 64
compared with 178 for all SSA judges. The MSPB AU recommended dismissal of Goodman, but
the full Board unanimously reversed. In what can only be described as a compromise verdict,
the Board established the principle that "there is no generic prohibition to" filing charges based
on low productivity. It also characterized Goodman's manner of handling his cases as
"unreasonably methodical." Nevertheless the Board ruled that the agency's showing that
Goodman's disposition rate was half the national average was not adequate proof of the charge.
The Board cited the agency's acknowledgement that its cases "did vary in difficulty" and "are not
fungible" and ruled that if the agency's case relied totally on comparative statistics, that more
proof of their validity was needed. Several subsequent SSA actions against AUs of low
productivity also failed on these grounds, and several judges (including Goodman) were awarded
attorneys fees for their trouble.'
In the end, although the MSPB established the principle that agencies
could base removal actions on grounds of low productivity, the amount of statistical proof required
(especially giving the dearth of government statistics on agency adjudication) may make such cases
nearly impossible to win. Still, the threat of such an action, and the possibility of having to
mount an expensive defense to it, may itself serve as a spur to agency productivity efforts.
A better approach for everyone would be a consensus-based approach to
setting productivity standards. As Professor Rosenblum has concluded:
Failure quantitatively to meet a
minimum or to stay within a maximum average
disposition rate could, arguably, provide a
rebuttable presumption of good cause, if the
5919 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984). The description relies on Rosenblum, supra note 51 at
620-627.
6 See Social Security Administration v. Balaban, 33 M.S.P.R. 309, 314-316 (1987);
Social Security Administration v. Goodman, 33 M.S.P.R. 325, 329-32 (1987). For a useful
digest of MSPB decisions concerning ALJs see, Streb, "The AU Digest: A Summary of
Statutes, Regulations of MSPB and OPM and Decisions of MSPB and the Courts Concerning
Disciplinary and Other Actions Affecting Administrative Law Judges." Office of Administrative
Law Judge, MSPB, July 6, 1990.
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rates have been determined for each agency
through consultations with and recommendations
by representative experts from the bench, bar
and academia concerned with that agency's
administrative adjudication, and if the agency has
made reasonable effort to accommodate to
particular judges' perceived and expressed needs
for assistance."i
In its Recommendation 86-7, the Administrative Conference has also
recognized the need for appropriately derived productivity norms:
1. Personnel management devices. Use of
internal agency guidelines for timely case
processing and measurements of the quality of
work products can maintain high levels of
productivity and responsibility. If appropriately
fashioned, they can do so without compromising
independence of judgment. Agencies possess and
should exercise the authority, consistent with the
AU's or other presiding officer's decisional
independence, to formulate written criteria for
measuring case handling efficiency, prescribe
procedures, and develop techniques for the
expeditious and accurate disposition of cases.
The experiences and opinions of presiding officers
should play a large part in shaping these criteria
and procedures. The criteria should take into
account differences in categories of cases
assigned to judges and in types of disposition
(e.g., dismissals, dispositions with and without
hearing). Where feasible, regular computerized
case status reports and supervision by higher
level personnel should be used in furthering the
systematic application of the criteria once they
have been formulated.'"
t
1Rosenblum, supro note 5 1 at 642.
62ACUS Recommendation 86-7, "Case Management as a Tool for Improving Agency
Adjudication," I CFR § 305.86-7 (1991).
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Role of the Chief AU
OPM has authorized the creation of about two dozen chief AU positions
with higher grade levels than the other AUs at the agency.'3  The establishment of such
positions is based on certifications from the agency that their chiefs devote a significant portion
of their time to administrative and management duties. There are, however, no governmenl-wide
norms as to what those duties should entail. The General Accounting Office urged that the chief
judges at each agency play a lead role in establishing performance standards for the quality and
quantity of the AU's work and that they also "review the procedures by which cases are formally
adjudicated to determine if simplified procedures can be used.""
A Congressional study focusing on delay in the regulatory process also
urged agency chief judges to take more responsibility for reviewing the work of their judges, for
both quality and quantity.'5 This is an issue that deserves more consideration by OPM and
Congress.
AUs and IGs
Another potential player in the debate over management of the
adjudicative process is the agency inspector general. IGs are in place in virtually all the agencies
employing AUs and are charged with, among other thins, promoting the economy, effectiveness
and efficiency in the administration of agency programs. The IG's independence and authority
to investigate certainly carries with it the potential to encroach upon the AU's decisional
independence.
The tension has actually occurred in a related administrative judicial
context in which judges of the U.S. Court of Military Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review
(a legislatively created tribunal for resolving military classification and discharge disputes) sought
an injunction to prevent the Department of Defense IG from requiring the judges to appear before
the IG to answer questions regarding improper influence allegedly exerted against judges in their
review of a court-martial conviction. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals granted the petition and
63
"Chief" status is conferred by land may be revoked by) the agency head.
64"Administrative Law Process: Better Management is Needed," Comptroller General,
Report to the Congress 48 (May 15, 1978) (FPCD-78-25).
65Study on Federal Regulation (Volume IV "Delay in the Regulatory Process") Sen.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs Committee Print 110-112, 95th Cong. I st Sess. (July 1977).
66See the Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. 1. 95-452, 92 Star. 1101, 5 U.S.C.
App. See also, The Inspector General Act of 1978: A Ten-Year Review, Sixty-first Report
by the House Comm. on Government Operations, House Report 100-1027, 199th Cong.
2nd Sess. (October 3, 1988).
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appointed a special master from one of its member judges to investigate the underlying
allegations."
The court did not dispute the IG's authority to investigate certain
improprieties such as "an allegation that an appellate military judge has submitted a false voucher
or has made a false claim for reimbursement of travel expenses incurred in performing his duties
as a judge."" On the other hand, the court concluded that "investigation of a court's
deliberative processes . . . is limited by a judicial privilege protecting the confidentiality of judicial
communications." 69
One such dispute has so far surfaced in the AU arena. At the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, pursuant to a Congressional request, the agency IG conducted an inquiry
into the mechanics of the issuance of an initial decision authorizing a full power license for the
Seabrook power plant." The Congressional request was based on the suggestion that sometime
between the rendering of the initial decision by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC's
adjudicatory tribunal, and the release of the decision to the parties and the public four days later,
it was "corruptly" changed. The Office of the IG conducted an investigation of the panel staff
although the Office conspicuously refrained from interviewing the Board members themselves. In
this case the NRC IG was quite properly sensitive to the concern that the judges' decisional
independence not be infringed.
AU Corps Proposals
Whether or not there is a problem of insufficient actual or perceived
independence of federal AUs or inefficiencies due to the decentralized nature of the administrative
judiciary, one solution that has persistently been proposed has been the "AU corps bill."" This
legislation would separate the AUs from the employing agencies and put them in the employ of
a new agency known as the Administrative Low Judge Corps. The Corps would be headed by a
6tUnited States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review v. Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328
(C.M.A. 1988).
68Id. at 337.
69Id
70See In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al (Seabrook
Station Unit I and 2), Docket Nos. 50-443-OL, 50-444-OL, Memorandum from
Administrative Law Judge Ivan W. Smith. (August 7, 1990).
7tS. 594, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 2711-13 (1989). See generally
Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S 594 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989), Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983).
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Chief AU and divided into eight subject-matler divisions each headed by a division chief AU. The
chief and division chiefs (all appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate) would form a Council which would administer the Corps. It would assign judges to
divisions, appoint new AUs (from an OPM register), prescribe rules of practice and procedure for
cases heard by the Corps, and manage the Corps' operations. The bill also includes new
provisions for the discipline and removal of AUs. The bill acknowledges the potential for change
in the dynamics of agency review of AU decisions by mandating a study of this subject.
This concept (which has been enacted in over a dozen states)7" has
consistently received the support of the major AU organizations as well as the American Bar
Association, but it has been opposed by the executive branch (as well as by some AUs)'" and
has fallen short of passage. (In the 101st Congress, S. 594 was reported favorably on a vote
of 9-5 by the Senate Judiciary Committee.14 It never reached the floor. In the House, no action
was taken although subcommittee hearings have been held in earlier Congresses.)
Support for the concept is based on two separate arguments-efficiency and
fairness (or at least perceptions of fairness). Opposition to the idea is based both on a
generalized feeling that the current system is not "broke" and that changes to it would lessen
expertise in the administrative judiciary and create a new "bureaucracy" of judges independent
of agency policy inputs. Indeed, despite the passage of a decade, the basic arguments ?ro and
con remain little different from the ones I summarized in a 1981 article for Judicature:
Proponents of the corps concept point
to the following benefits:
Operational efficiency would be
enhanced by a corps made up of interchangeable
judges, who could be assigned to agency cases
12The states with "central panels" for all or some of their agency hearings include: CA,
CO, FL, HA, MA, MD, MN, MO, NJ, NC, ND, PA, TN, WA, WI, WY. Letter to author from
Randy E. Bloom, State of New Jersey Office of Administrative Low. New York City also using
a similar system, although the Governor of New York vetoed a state-wide system in July,
1989.
73See Hearings on S. 594, supra note 70. Testimony of witnesses from the National
Conference of Administrative Law Judges, Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference,
Association of [SSA] Administrative Law Judges and the American Bar Association in support
of bill, and the Department of Justice, Social Security Administration, and the Forum of United
States Administrative Law Judges opposing the bill.
7
4Administrative Law Judge Corps Act, Report of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st
Cong., 2d Sess., Report 101-467 (September 19, 1990)
75Lubbers, supro note 5, at 273-275.
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as the need arises. Since agency caseloads ore
not always predictable or within the agency's
control, the number of AUs employed under the
present system by agencies may be too high or
too low.
Centralized housekeeping and
accounting would save money. Present
redundancies in law libraries, docket clerks, case-
tracking systems, administrative assistants, travel
arrangements and the reservation of hearing
facilities would be eliminated. And unification
would promote uniformity in the quality of office
space, low clerks and secretarial assistance.
Public confidence in the
impartiality and independence of AUs would be
enhanced by a divorce from agency
administration. Since many ALIs were also
formerly lawyers for their agency, since some
perquisites of the job (e.g., office space, parking
privileges and travel to seminars) remain in
agency control, and since long-term association
with one agency's policies and personnel may
subtly influence behavior, AUs may be
susceptible to a pro-agency bias that would be
lessened if they were centralized in a separate
corps.
* If the judges were not attached
to agencies, they would require agencies to
articulate their regulations in clearer language,
much as federal judges often do.
* Individual AUs would acquire a
diversified experience and not become stale from
repeatedly hearing similar cases. This,
apparently, has been a salutary by-product of the
existing, but limited loan program in which OPM
allows understaffed agencies to temporarily
borrow the services of willing AUs from other
agencies. This diversity of caseload might also
stimulate the recruitment of new AUs.
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Operation of a corps might
facilitate performance evaluation of AUs, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. This is obviously
a controversial issue since evaluation of judicial
performance bears such a close relationship to
independent values. But since the agencies
would have a less direct interest in the
evaluation of any particular judge, it could
probably be done more objectively.
Operation of a corps might
permit a return to a multi-level grade system
whereby more routine cases could be handled by
lower-level, less experienced, AUs. Professor
[now Justice] Antonin Scalia has argued that a
multi-level system would be more efficient and
would also inject needed performance incentives
into the corps.
Opponents think the problems and
drawbacks would outweigh any of the
advantages, however:
. A unified corps would reduce
efficiency, since it would dilute the expertise that
staff AUs bring to their agency. Agency statutes,
regulations and precedent can be difficult to
master in a short time, and practitioners would
be forced to educate-and reeducate-AUs
unfamiliar with the particular field of regulation.
• A new bureaucracy would have
to be created to train and rotate over 1,100
judges to 30 agencies for over 200,000 hearings
all over the country. If evaluation or
promotional responsibilities were also given to
the new office, the director's independence and
"clout" would become a critical concern. The
wrong mix could lead to greater politicalization
than critics find in the current program.
* An equitable system for
allocating AUs to agencies for hearings would
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have to be devised. Since judges are not "free
goods," perhaps some sort of "user's fee" would
have to be charged agencies. Otherwise,
agencies might draw too liberally upon AUs for
non-judicial functions or reduce their own efforts
to settle cases prior to the hearing stage.
The agency's reviewing function
might be altered in unforeseen ways. Some
proponents argue that establishment of a corps
should be linked to a restriction of the agency's
ability to review initial decisions of AUs. The
wisdom in this is debatable, but without such a
change agencies likely would feel the need to
review more initial decisions more intensively (in
light of their reduced rapport of familiarity with
the judges), leading to an overall lengthening of
the decisional process.
All of these arguments still apply today, although the dominance of the
three agencies (SSA, NLRB and the Labor Department) in the AU cadre tends to make the case
for the corps somewhat more difficult to make. Clearly the efficiency argument retains force with
respect to the other 28 agencies with a few AUs, and I continue to believe that an experiment
with a pooling of judges among some of those agencies would be a good idea."' Another
change which may take some of the steam out of the corps proposal is a recent pay raise for
all AUs-with a proportionally larger raise going to lower graded social security AUs who have
been among the strongest proponents of the corps legislation."
76The experiment was described in Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to
See the Forest and the Trees, 31 Fed. Bar News & J. 383, 386 (November, 1984). The
recent banking legislation, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
of 1989, required the five bank regulatory agencies, which had theretofore borrowed their
AUs from other agencies, to organize such a pool. Pub. L. 101-73 § 916(1), 103 Stat. 183
)1989).
77Pub. 1. 101-509, § 104; Stat. 1445-1446. See also, OPM interim AU pay
regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 6208 (Feb. 14, 1991). The new pay scale substitutes for the
former GS-15-18 scale a new set of 8 levels AL- 1, AL-2 and AL-3 (A through F). AL-1 equals
the basic pay for level IV of the Executive Schedule (the top of the Senior Executive Service
scale). AL-2 is 95% of that amount and AL-3 (F), the lowest level, is 65% of that amount.
Most AUs are at the AL-3 (E) or AL-3 (F) levels. The rate for the former GS- 15 judges (mostly
Social Security judges) was proportionately higher.
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Management Initiatives
Other than managing the AUs themselves, what types of initiatives can
agencies pursue to introduce more efficiency and expedition into their adjudication process? The
Administrative Conference studied one of the more efficient adjudicative operations in the federal
government, the Department of HHS Departmental Appeals Board 8 which adjudicates disputes
arising out of the Department's many grant programs. The Conference distilled a series of
recommendations for case management.
Several general recommendations were made, covering the proceeding as
a whole:
2. Step-by-step time goals. Case
management by presiding officers and their
supervisors should be combined with procedures
designed to move cases promptly through each
step in the proceeding. These include (a) a
program of step-by-step time goals for the main
stages of a proceeding, (b) a monitoring system
that pinpoints problem cases, and (c) a
management committed to expeditious processing.
Time guidelines should be fixed in all cases for
all decisional levels within the agency, largely
with the input of presiding officers and others
affected. While the guidelines should be flexible
enough to accommodate exceptional cases and
should maintain their nonobligatory nature, they
should be sufficiently fixed to keep routine items
moving and ensure that any delays are justified.
Agencies should encourage a management
commitment by including specific goals or duties
of timely case processing in pertinent job
descriptions.
3. Expedited options. Agencies
should develop, and in some instances require
78Formerly known as the HHS Grant Appeals Board. See Cappalli, Model for Case
Management: The Grant Appeals Board, 1986 ACUS Recommendations and Reports 663.
79ACUS Recommendation 86-7, "Case Management as a Tool for Improving Agency
Adiudication." I CFR § 305.86-7 (1991).
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parties to use, special expedited procedures.
Different rules may need to be developed for
handling small cases as well as for larger ones
that do not raise complex legal or factual issues.
4. Case file system.
(a) Agencies should develop
procedures to ensure early compilation of
relevant documents in a case file. This will help
the presiding officer delineate the legal and
factual issues, the parties' positions and the basis
for the action as promptly as possible. The
presiding officer may then structure the process
suitably and issue preliminary management
directives.
(b) Disputes preceded by party
interactions or investigations which create a
substantial factual record, as in most contract and
grant disputes, are especially amenable to this
approach. Cases involving strong fact conflicts or
in which data are peculiarly within the possession
of one party who has motivations to suppress
them may be less suitable for a case file system.
5. Two stage resolution approaches.
In proceedings where the case file system is less
appropriate, as where factual conflicts render
discovery important, agencies should consider
using a two-phase procedure.
(a) Phase one might be an
abbreviated discovery phase directed by a
responsible official, with the product of that
discovery forming the "appeal file" for the next
phase. Alternatively, parties could be channeled
into a private dispute resolution mode, such as
mediation, negotiation or arbitration, which, even
if unsuccessful, can serve to define major issues
and to advance development of the record.
Before employing this alternative, agencies would
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have to determine whether the confidentiality
rule that normally attaches to arbitration,
mediation and negotiation is so critical that it
cannot be abandoned for the sake of a more
efficient second stage.
(b) A second stage, if necessary,
should proceed under active case management,
as recommended.
The step-by-step time guideline suggestion in T 2 was bolstered by a
detailed examination of the experience of three other agencies (Civil Aeronautics Board, NLRB, and
FTC) which also developed successful case processing systems incorporating such guidelines.'
The "private dispute resolution mode" suggestion in 1 5 was the
Administrative Conference's first tentative reference to what would become a major theme in
ensuing years: alternative dispute resolution.
The Prehearing Stage
The recommendation concerning compilation of a case file has special
significance for the prehearing stage. A consistent theme of Administrative Conference
recommendations over the years is that agency presiding officers should make better use of
prehearing conferences. As early as 1970, ACUS asserted that presiding officers should normally
hold at least one prehearing - conference in complex or potentially lengthy cases and that
evidentiary witness lists be exchanged by the parties at that time."' Twenty years later, ACUS
reiterated the usefulness of such conferences, this time in the context of cases at the other end
of the complexity spectrum, social security cases. ACUS urged SSA to encourage its AUs to use
prehearing conferences "to frame the issues involved in AU hearings, identify matters not in
dispute, and decide appropriate cases favorably without hearings." Telephone prehearing
conferences were also contemplated, but a caution was given that when claimants were not
represented by counsel (a dwindling number of SSA cases) prehearing conferences were rarely
appropriate.83
soPou and Jones, Agency Time Limits as a Tool for Reducing Regulatory Delay, 1986
ACUS Recommendation Reports 835.
81ACUS Recommendation 70-4 (formerly No. 2 1 ) "Discovery in Agency Adjudication"
§ 1, Recommendations and Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States
(vol. 1) 38 (1970).
82ACUS Recommendation 90-4, supra note 37, § 2.
83
1d
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The importance of the prehearing conference was also recognized in the
recently enacted Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, which amended the APA's list of presiding
officer's powers by adding the explicit power of requiring the attendance at prehearing conferences
of at least one representative of each party who has authority to negotiate over settlement of the
case."
This legislation will go a long way to helping to implement another key
element of Recommendation 86-7, much of which derived from the successful mediation activity
performed by the Departmental Appeals Board in HHS.55
6. Seeking party concessions and
offering mediation. Presiding officers should
promote party agreement and concessions on
procedural and substantive issues, as well as on
matters involving facts and documents, to reduce
hearing time and sometimes avoid hearing
altogether. Agencies should also (a) encourage
decisional officers to resolve cases (or parts
thereof) informally, (b) provide their officers
training in mediation and other ADR methods,
and (c) routinely offer parties the services of
trained mediators.
The prehearing phase is also often the best time to consider using the settlement judge technique
for resolving cases, discussed at greater length by Philip Harter.
The Hearing Stage
Recommendation 86-7 also prescribes several other nuts-and-bolts techniques
for presiding officers to use in managing the hearings:
7. Questioning techniques.
(a) Requests for clarification or
development of record. If a party makes a
statement in a notice of appeal, brief, or other
submission which a presiding officer does not
understand, doubts, or wishes clarified, the officer
B45 U.S.C § 556(c)(8).
BsSupro note 77.
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should consider requiring the party to expand
upon its position. The ambiguity may relate to
a factual matter, or an interpretation of a legal
precedent or a document. Similarly, by
preliminary study of the case file, the presiding
officer could identify missing information and
require the party with access to such information
to remedy the deficiency. The officer could also
issue "invitations to brief" difficult questions of
statutory interpretation or the like.
(b) Written questions for conference
or hearing. The presiding officer should manage
cases so as to limit issues, proof, and argument
to core matters. Having ascertained the factual
and legal ambiguities in each side's case by
careful study of the briefs and documentation
submitted, the presiding officer should structure
a prehearing conference or hearing as forum for
addressing these ambiguities by seeking
responses to carefully formulated questions and
providing appropriate opportunity for rebuttal. In
this way, and by otherwise seeking to identify
the specific questions in dispute early on, the
presiding officer would focus parties' attention on
key issues and deflect unproductive procedural
maneuvers.
8. lme extension practices. ime
extensions should be granted only upon strong,
documented justification. While procedural
fairness mandates that deadlines may be
extended for good cause, presiding officers
should be aware that casual, customary
extensions have serious negative effects on on
adjudicatory system, its participants, and those
wishing access thereto. Stern warnings
accompanying justified extensions have had good
success in curtailing lawyers' requests for
additional time.
9. Joint consideration of cases with
common issues. Whenever practicable and fair,
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cases involving common questions of law or fact
should be consolidated and heard jointly.
Consolidation could include unification of
schedules, briefs, case files, and hearings.
10. Use of telephone conferences and
hearings. Presiding officers should take full
advantage of telephone conferences as a means
to hear motions, to hold prehearing conferences,
and even to hear the merits of administrative
proceedings where appropriate. While telephone
conferences may be either employed regularly for
handling selected matters or limited to a case-by-
case basis at the suggestion of the presiding
officer or counsel, experience suggests that
maximum benefits are derived when telephone
conferences are made presumptive for certain
matters.
All of these suggestions are more or less applicable to most types of
agency adjudications, although one must always remember the difference in presiding officer
responsibilities in different types of cases. For example, while an SSA U may not have to worry
about settlement negotiations, multi-party proceedings or extensive procedural maneuvering, he or
she must be especially diligent in making sure the claimant's evidence is complete. This "apples
and oranges" problem is the reason that there may never be a truly uniform "code" of
administrative adjudicative procedures. Nevertheless, on a "macro" scale, there are some initiatives
looking toward greater uniformity that are worth mentioning.
The Administrative Conference's Manual for Administrative Law Judges is
one long-standing effort to bring more uniformity to agency adjudications.B6 The aforementioned
study of the applicability of a modified set of the Federal Rules of Evidence to agency
adjudications is another. Perhaps the most ambitious is an ongoing Administrative Conference
effort to draft a set of "model" rules of practice and procedure for agency AU proceedings. The
Conference's effort is based on successful agency efforts to develop consolidated rules of practice
for all of the adjudications heard by AUs in that agency. For example, the Department of
Labor's consolidated rules of practice cover over 60 different types of hearings ranging from
86Ruhlen, Manual for Administrative Low Judges, Adminisirative Conference of the U.S.
(rev. ed. 1982) (1st ed. 1974).
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benefit cases (black lung compensation) to civil money penalty and other enforcement cases.1
7
The Department of Agriculture has a similar set of unified agency rules of practice.88 Most
recently Congress required the five federal banking regulatory agencies to develop a uniform set
of rules of procedure for their adjudications."' The Conference's working group hopes to develop
model rules (with commentary) that can be used as a reference point for other such efforts.
The Posthearing Stage
Delays in the agency review stage have bedeviled administrative
adjudicators for a long time. A major problem that was addressed by the Administrative
Conference in one of its earlier recommendations was the commonplace statutory or regulatory
requirement that the agency head review all of the decisions issued by the agency's AUs. This
problem was exacerbated in some multi-member boards or commissions where the entire body
did the reviewing. The Conference first urged agency heads to use intermediate appellate boards
to screen the appeals.' Needless to say, this is a time-saver only if the intermediate board
screens enough cases. The model has been used sparingly, most notably at the NRC and FCC
with mixed success.9 Second (and more significantly), the Conference urged that agency
reviewing officials use (and be authorized to use) a system of discretionary review of initial
decisions. In other words, that the agency should announce that it will deny petitions for
review or summarily affirm initial decisions unless petitioners make a reasonable showing of an
erroneous material finding of fad or legal conclusion or that the decision has a policy importance
that warrants review. With some important exceptions,93 most agencies now utilize the
discretionary review model.
Use of these screening techniques should bring down the average post
hearing elapsed time for all cases, but delay problems persist in those cases accepted for review
by agencies. For example, an internal SEC study of adjudications in the 83 years since January
8729 CFR Part 18 (1990). DOL Chief AU Nahum Litt estimated the number of statutes
covered, conversation with the author, April 1991.
887 CFR § 1. 130 (1991).
89Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101 -73
§ 916 (2), 103 Stat. 183.
90ACUS Recommendation 68-6, "Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to
Discretionary Review by the Agency. T 2(a), 1 CFR § 305.68-6 (1991).
91Indeed, recently both the NRC and FCC have proposed elimination of their
intermediate review boards. NRC proposed rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 42947 (October 24, 1990),
is still pending. The FCC proposed elimination of its Review Board at 55 Fed. Reg. 28063,
28065 (July 9, 1990), but decided to retain it, 56 Fed. Reg. 787, 790 (January 9, 1991).
92ACUS Recommendation 68-6, supra note 89, § 2(b).
93Cf. the NLRB, SEC and FTC.
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1982, found that the average elapsed time for the AU phase of the case was 13 months while
the Commission took 17 additional months to render its decision." Rough statistics developed
by the Administrative Conference, collated by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in 1977,
showed that the agency review phase exceeded the hearing phase in both licensing and
ratemaking cases and was a significant period in enforcement cases as well.9'
Reduction in these delays requires a combination of internal management
initiatives and outside oversight. Obviously, if pressures are brought to bear on agency
administrators and chairmen, steps can be taken to raise the priority of completing action on
appealed cases. ime limits can be promulgated and honored (at least by enforced explanation
as to why the time limit has been missed). More frequent board and commission meetings can
be devoted to decisional activity. More resources can be devoted to opinion writing staffs. Of
course, a willingness to decide politically difficult cases without undue procrastination is also
necessary.
But little is likely to happen without outside monitoring of each agency's
record in this area. Congressional oversight in this area does take place occasionally when delay
problems emerge out of the mist. The problem is that there is too much mist-and it can only
be dispelled by a concerted effort to collect and evaluate agency statistics on administrative
adjudication.
Need for Statistics on Administrative Proceedings
There is no dearth of data concerning activity of the federal courts.
Extensive statistics have been systematically collected and disseminated since 1940 in the annual
reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Moreover, in 1968, the
Federal Judicial Center was created to serve as the research arm of the courts, and it has relied
heavily on the statistics gathered by the Administrative Office.
In the administrative arena, a small unit in the Department of Justice
compiled statistics on formal proceedings conducted by hearing examiners from 1957-1959. This
effort was continued by the Temporary Administrative Conference in 1961-62 and by a Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee in 1963-65. These disjointed efforts led to a mass of rather unusable
data. In 1973, ACUS began another effort to compile statistics on agency cases (called the
Uniform Caseload Accounting System) which led to two volumes of data arranged by agency and
94Remarks Before the Twenty-Third Annual Rocky Mountain Stote-Federal-Provincial
Securities Conference by Commissioner Mary L. Schapiro at page 8 (October 12, 1990).
95Study of Federal Regulation, supra note 64 at 6.
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case type for the years 1975-1978.96 In 1977, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee made
extensive use of these statistics and concluded that the ACUS "effort is a step in the right
direction, but needs refinement, enforcement capability, permanence, and adequate funding."
'
The Committee went on to formally recommend that:
. An appropriate committee of the
House and Senate should oversee management
efforts comprehensively, including the setting and
meeting of deadlines, at Federal regulatory
agencies. Each agency should be required to
submit periodically to Congress a report
describing deadlines imposed on agency
proceedings, the agency's degree of success in
adhering to the deadlines, and the reasons for
any delays.
. The Administrative Conference
should have the permanent tasks of insuring that
statistics are generated by the various agencies,
and that the statistics are brought together and
comprehensively explored. The information
compiled should include the deadlines established
for proceedings, the rates of success at meeting
these deadlines, and the reasons for failure to
meet them.968
Despite these words of encouragement, the Administrative Conference had
to discontinue its limited statistical efforts in 1979 for budgetary and staffing reasons and has not
been able to gamer the resources for this important effort in the ensuing decade. (As an aside,
for comparative purposes, the Conference total budget grew from S250,000 in 1969 to almost
96See Federal Administrative Law Judge Hearings: Statistical Report for 1976-1978,
supra note 8 at 1-6 for a fuller description of this history.
91Study of Federal Regulation, supra note 64 at 151.
98Id. at 152.
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S2 million in 1990 while the federal Judicial Center's budget went from $300,000 to over
$13 million in the same period.99
This lack of statistics on agency adjudication (and on agencybrulemaking
for that matter) makes it exceedingly difficult to assess agency procedural efficiency, manpower
needs, or the need for proposed reforms such as alternative dispute resolution of the AU corps
bills. Recently, for example, during the consideration of the Fair Housing Act Amendments of
1989, a dispute arose over the relative efficiency of AU hearings versus federal district court
enforcement. Both the Justice Department and civil rights groups asked Administrative Conference
for its l0-year-old data which remains the best available compendium.t" There is an
unquestionable need for these data; with the widespread availability of desktop computers and
appropriate software, the benefits of such an effort should exceed the costs by an even larger
ratio.
Choice of Fomm for Adjudication
Observers of the federal adjudication process may be surprised to read
Article III of the Constitution which provides that the "Judicial Power of the United States" shall
be vested in courts whose judges enjoy tenure during good behavior and protection against
reduction in salary. '  Obviously, many "federal cases" are decided by adjudicators who are
not the sort of "Article I1" judges serving under that provision of the Constitution.
As Richard Fallon has admirably detailed,'0 the "article III literalism"
position was doomed from the start. The first Congress assigned to Treasury Department officials
disputes over veterans' benefits and customs duties. And in 1828 the Supreme Court, through
Chief Justice Marshall, held that Congress may create non-article III courts to adjudicate disputes
99The Conference's figures come from the 1969 Annual Report of the Administrative
Conference 1 ($250,000 budget for 19691 and the 1990 Annual Report of the
Administrative Conference 29 ($ 1.865 million appropriations for 1990). The Federal Judicial
Center's figures come from the Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
United States for 1969 3 (Director of FJC reports 1969 appropriation of $300,000) and the
FY 1990 Budget of the United States, Appendix 1 -B8 1$ 13.17 million appropriation for
1990).
]DOSupro note 8 Ultimately a compromise was reached which provides for
administrative enforcement with HUD AUs, but with the right of respondents to "remove" the
case to federal district court. Pub. L. No 100-430, § 8(2), 102 Stat. 1629 (1988) (codified
or 42 USC § 3612).
101Article II, § 1
102Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Il1, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 915 (1988).
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in the federal territories." 3 These so-alled legislative (or "Article I") courts (because they were
created by the legislative branch) survive today in the territories, the District of Columbia, in the
military, or in highly specialized situations, such as the adjudication of claims against the United
States.
The constitutionality of administrative agency adjudication was established
a century later, when the Supreme Court upheld Congress' decision to vest responsibility for
deciding cases under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to an
administrative agency (on the ground that "public rights" were at issue)-so long as adequate
review in an Article III court of the agency's decision exists.1' 4 Thus the foundation for the New
Deal and the APA was laid.
The upshot of the Supreme Court's movement away from Article III
literalism is that there now exists a continuum of federal adjudicative forums. The continuum is
arranged below according to the status of the odjudicator-which largely corresponds to the
independence of the adjudicator and the formality of the adjudication.
Artide III Judges
The three-tiered federal judiciary currently contains nine Supreme Court
justices, 155 court of appeals judges divided into 13 Circuits (one of which, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, has a somewhat specialized subject-mater jurisdiction) and 575 district court
judges divided into 94 districts.'' The specialized Court of International Trade (eight judges,
five senior judges) is also an Article III tribunal.'
103American Insurance Co- v. Carter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). Discussed in Fallon,
supro note 101 at 921-923.
104Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). Discussed in Fallon, supro note 101 at
923-925.
IDS See Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, Report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States, December 14, 1990. In his comparison of federal
adjudicators, Professor Bruff pointed out, "The Constitution's focus on life tenure and salary
stability as attributes of federal judges suggests that the constitutional statute of their
adjudicators depends mostly on their job security." Id. at 27.
106All statistics compiled from 1991 Judicial Staff Directory, Staff Directories, Ltd.,
Mount Vernon, Va. (1991). There were also 70 senior circuit judges and 207 district judges.
t07There are also numerous magistrates, bankruptcy judges and special masters who
serve as "adjuncts" to federal district courts.
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Artide I Judges
Judges on the various legislative courts have come to closely resemble
those of the Article III judges. Judges on the Claims Court (16 judges, two senior judges), Tax
Court (18 judges, nine senior judges, 14 special trial judges), Court of Military Appeals (two
judges, one senior judge) and the new Court of Veterans Appeals (seven judges), have 15-year
terms and can be removed only for cause. Although the possibility of reappointment may create
some effect on independence values, the terms are quite long and few judges have been denied
reappointment. In other respects, the judges on these courts function as Article III judges.
Administrative Law Judges
As described above, there are approximately 1,100 AUs. It is a simple
matter for Congress to mandate the use of an AU to preside over agency hearings. Any statute
that offers the opportunity for an "APA hearing" (or some variant thereof) or a "hearing on the
record" (but not simply a "hearing") is deemed to require an AU (or agency head) hearing.
There are probably over 500 such statutes in the U.S. Code that so require, many of which
contain more than one provision requiring APA hearings.tw
Much ink has been spilled on the extent of AU independence. Suffice
it to say that although one often hears about the perceptions among the bar that AUs are not
sufficiently independent (or are too imbued with the agency's mission) and one often hears
grumbling from agency officials that AUs are too independent, the reality is that they have
decisional independence, they act like judges (may wear robes and are referred to as "your
honor") and agency officials are quite wary of any extra-judicial efforts to influence their decisions.
Nevertheless, there have been increasing efforts to separate the adjudicative arm of the program
from the policymaking arm-even more so than is now dictated by the separation-of-functions
provisions in the APA. 0'
An early example of this was the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act's creation of an
independent General Counsel within the structure of the National Labor Relations Board."'0 The
General Counsel "prosecutes" these cases before the Board (and its AUs). An even greater
separation has been achieved by the so-called "split-enforcement" model in which the rulemaking
and prosecuting agency seeks to enforce its rules before a separate, purely adjudicative
Commission with its own AUs. Examples of this include the Department of Labor's Occupational
10SPierce identified 280 separate evidentiory provisions in 1986. Of course, many more
statutes ore silent on that point, Pierce, supra note 38.
109See text at notes 70-75, supra.
1t0Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 139; 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)
1988
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Safely and Health Administration (OSHA) and Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) which
must seek enforcement by the independent Occupational Safely and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC) and Federal Mine Safely and Health Review Commission, (FMSHRC), respectively."'
The OSHA-OSHRC and MSHA-FMSHRC models have not been free of controversy and, despite careful
review of this approach, the Administrative Conference was unable to decide whether or when such
a model was preferable to the traditional single-agency model. "2
"Non-AU" Presiding Officers
The APA itself recognizes that many adjudications need not be heard by
AUs. Some types of adjudicatory programs are explicitly excepted from all of the APA's
adjudication requirements, e.g., cases involving the selection or tenure of federal employees other
than AUs (now heard by Merit System Protection Board hearing officers), certification of worker
representatives (now heard by NLRB regional office personnel) or the conduct of military or
foreign affairs functions (there are many military and foreign service boards and panels).
The APA also allows for the possibility that another statute might designate
other categories of boards or employees to preside over specific types of APA hearings. Thus the
NRC's statute specifies that the Atomic Safely and Licensing Board Panel (made up of technical
experts as well as lawyers) hears and decides nuclear power licensing cases using APA hearing
procedures.
Finally, perhaps the largest group of non-AU adjudicators are used by
agencies to preside over hearings that are not required by statute to be "on the record" or
"under the APA." In those situations, the agency is free, within the bounds of due process, to
fashion its procedures as it sees fit and to use any employee as presider. Some are presided
over by statutorily designated officers who are equivalent to AUs such as immigration judges in
the Department of Justice or the "administrative judges" on the various agency Boards of Contract
Appeals." '3 Other program areas use presiders appointed on an ad hoc basis. At this point
the line between "formal" and "informal" adjudication begins to break down.
A recent Administrative Conference survey of federal agencies, seeking
information on programs that offer the opportunity for oral hearings presided over by non-AUs
"'See Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and
MSHA Experiences, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315 (1987).
112ACUS Recommendation 86-4, "The Split-Enforcement Model for Agency
Adjudication," 1 CFR § 305.86-4 (1991). The Conference is currently examining another
split-enforcement scheme-the National Transportation Safety Board's adjudication of FAA pilot
license suspension and revocation cases.
"13See Robie and Morse, The Federal Executive Branch Adjudicator: Alive (and) Well
Outside the Administrative Procedure Act? 33 Fed. Bar News & J. 133 (March 1986).
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turned up 2,739 presiding officers." 4 Of these, 435 have no other duties and 1,832 have other
duties. Even subtracting the 1,692 presiding officers involved with veterans benefits claims cases
at the Department of Veterans Affairs, there are nearly as many non-AU presiders as AUs."t
There is little uniformity among these presiders."' Most fall somewhere
between GS-9 and GS-15 on the pay scale (AUs' salaries roughly correspond to the GS-15 to GS-
18 scale)."' In most cases, they are simply hired like other federal employees (lawyers or non-
lawyers), are subject to performance appraisals, and have no special protections against adverse
personnel actions. Perhaps most important, there is no real coordinated oversight of the needs
or activities of this diverse group of hearing officers-unlike the AUs, they haven't even organized
themselves. Nobody is assessing the independence of these adjudicators, the fairness or efficiency
of their proceedings or their appropriate place in the federal adjudicative system. They are now
the real "invisible" judiciary.
Informal Adjudication
Even less visible are the less formal adjudications that go on throughout
government with varying levels of formality. Many such decisions are reached with only a
minimum or procedure, and without oral hearings. Such decisions include determinations to issue
loans or grants, release information, conduct audits, approve plans, charge fees, etc. It is
impossible to catalog comprehensively these informal adjudications-and the APA provides little
guidance to agencies that make these sorts of decisions. Professor Verkuil provided the sharpest
focus on a slice of this pie when he examined such programs in four Departments." 8 He found
a wide variety of procedural ingredients in the programs-though most made an effort to use an
impartial decisionmaker.'
Because of the variety of informal processes, the drafters of the APA
decline to set out procedure to govern them. A longstanding goal of some administrative
reformers have been to amend the APA to add a section on informal adjudication procedures."7°
t4See Frye, Study of Non-AU Hearing Programs, draft report to the Administrative
Conference of the U.S. 15 (March, 19911
115ld.
Itt/d
117 See note 76, supra.
t t8Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 739 (1976).
119Id. at 760, n. 80 (finding that 38 of 42 programs so provided).
120See, e.g., Gardner, The Procedures by Which Informal Action is Taken, 24 Admin.
L. Rev. 155, 158-166 (1972) (containing a draft "Informal Procedure Act of 1980"). See
also Levinson, Elements of the Administrative Process: Formal, Semi-Formal, and Free-Form
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This has not occurred, despite increasing uncertainty as to what due process requires in varying
situations and despite some constructive examples of such provisions in state APAs.'2'
Condusion
It is hard to believe that Congress has created such a fragmented federal
adjudicative system by design. Did members of Congress really stop and think when they placed
the trials of numerous types of governmental disputes (e.g., federal tort claims, Freedom of
Information Act appeals, Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement cases) in federal district court,
others (e.g., social security benefit claims, unfair labor practice charges, or SEC civil penalty cases)
before agency AUs, and other (immigration cases, veterans benefits cases) before non-AU hearing
officers?
What factors should be considered by Congress in allocating adjudicative
responsibilities among article III courts, article I courts, AUs and non-AUs? This is a macro-
management question of the first order. Public administrators, administrative lawyers and political
scientists must focus on this question in the coming decade, or else many of the fine tuning and
micro-management initiatives discussed in this paper will quickly become irrelevant.
A Reform Agenda
As suggested above, federal agency adjudication needs to be reexamined
on both a macro and a micro level.
On the macro level, the current landscape needs to be remapped and
reordered. Congress needs guidance as to how to allocate dispute resolution among Article III
courts, Article I courts and administrative agencies. Within the administrative agencies, Congress
and agency heads need to be advised on when to choose to require administrative law judges
or non-AU hearing officers, formal adjudication or informal adjudication, split-enforcement
adjudication or traditional single-agency adjudication. The Administrative Procedure Act's
adjudication provisions-so painstakingly designed to reflect differences between types of cases-may
need fortifying, clarifying or revamping. The role of the administrative law judge in this system
needs to be examined with special attention to the judicialization of the position (for better or
worse) and to the fact that many important adjudicative programs are being channelled away
Models, 26 Am. U. L. Rev. 872 (1977).
121See Model State Administrative Procedure Act, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1981), providing for "conference adjudicative
hearings" (§ 4-401) and "Summary adjudicative hearings" (§ 4-502). The comments to
§§ 4-102 and 4-201 indicated the intent and derivation of these provisions.
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from AUs.' These fundamental issues should be at the top of the list of administrative law
reformers. Not surprisingly, the Administrative Conference is mounting a study of many of these
issues.
But there are also more incremental issues that deserve attention. From
a management point of view reducing delay in administrative adjudication continues to be
important. First and foremost, an adequate statistical collection and data analysis capability for
agency cases need to be established. Once the bottlenecks are identified and the causes
understood, more definitive suggestions can be made.
In the meantime, however, it is possible to suggest some areas of concern
and identify some tentative recommendations.
. Time limits and case tracking should be
institutionalized at agencies.
. Model or uniform rules of practice and
procedure (including rules of evidence) should be
explored.
. AUs should be given additional means for
controlling hearings (including more power to
reject duplicative evidence, and sanction frivolous
or disruptive behavior).
. Better mechanisms need to be developed for
handling complaints against allegedly biased or
abusive AUs.
. Recruitment of AUs should be enhanced by
eliminating veterans preference in hiring for that
position.
. Productivity guidelines should be arrived at
consensually with each agency's AUs.
127Recently Congress has even authorized agency adjudication of civil money penalties
with non-AU hearing officers. See, e.g., the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986,
42 U.S.C. § 300h-2 (1989 Supp.) and the Water Quality Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1989
Supp.) (authorizing non-AUs when penalty below $25,000). See Edles, Civil Penalties
Receive New Attention, 9 Admin. L. Notes I (Federal Bar Association) (April 1990).
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. Agencies with a few AUs should experiment
with a pool (or "mini-corps") of AUs.
. AUs should have more opportunities for
training and continuing legal education.
. Telephone and video hearings should be
explored.
. Separation-of-fundions rules should be
loosened in non-accusatory proceedings.
. Agency discovery rules should be
reexamined.
. Agency heads should delegate more final
decisional authority to AUs.
. Chief AUs ought to be given more
administrative power and responsibility.
. The administrative process should be made
more accessible to those who cannot-or choose
not-to hire lawyers.
This is one observer's laundry list of future concerns for public
administrators and lawyers concerned about federal agency adjudication. But, in closing, it should
be noted that all of these mi-'s !sues (and even the macro ones) need to be considered in the
context of our societal discouragement with the litigation model and the concomitant movement
toward alternative forms of dispute resolution. What is the role of adversarial hearings? When
are they to be preferred and when are they necessary only as a last resort? Similarly, when do
we need a judge and when do we need a neutral dispute resolution specialist? With this in
mind, the focus now shifts to the backdrop-alternative dispute resolution.
